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When deciding whether to participate in a private school choice program, private school leaders 
weigh additional financial benefits against additional regulatory costs. In theory, raising the costs 
associated with entering private school choice programs should reduce the likelihood that 
individual schools participate in those programs. However, very little empirical evidence exists 
evaluating this idea. While a few studies suggest that more highly regulated programs are 
correlated with lower levels of school participation, none have established causal relationships 
between these factors, and none have determined which program regulations are the most costly. 
 Because it is nearly impossible to randomly assign program regulations to individual 
private schools, we use surveys to randomly assign different regulations to 3,080 private school 
leaders in Florida and ask them whether they would participate in a new private school choice 
program during the following school year. Relative to no regulations, our most conservative 
models find that open-enrollment mandates reduce the likelihood that private schools are certain 
to participate by about 17 percentage points, or 70 percent. State standardized testing 
requirements reduce the likelihood that private schools are certain to participate by 11 percentage 
points, or 44 percent. We find no evidence to suggest that the prohibition of copayment affects 
program participation overall. These estimates of the impact of regulatory requirements on the 
expressed willingness of private school principals to participate in a private school choice 
program are causal because random assignment leads to equivalence in expectation across 
treatment and control groups on both measurable and unmeasurable factors. We also find 
evidence to suggest that higher quality schools – as measured by tuition levels and enrollment 
trends – are more likely to be deterred by program regulations. 
Keywords: private school; school choice; school vouchers; schooling supply; regulations 
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JEL Classifications: I28, I20 
 
Introduction 
Private school leaders decide whether to participate in voucher programs across the U.S. each 
year. If a given private school leader expects that additional benefits of participation will exceed 
the additional costs of participation, they will decide to participate in the program. The main 
benefit associated with participation is additional revenue from the voucher, while the main cost 
is additional government regulation. All else equal, an increase in the regulatory burden 
associated with program participation should decrease the likelihood that private school leaders 
elect to participate. However, while other studies find that more voucher program regulation is 
generally correlated with lower rates of program participation (DeAngelis & Burke, 2017; Sude, 
DeAngelis, & Wolf, 2018), none of the existing empirical studies provides causal evidence that 
regulation reduces program participation, and none of them determine which types of regulations 
are the most costly to private schools. 
This study fills this problematic hole in the literature by being the first experimental 
evaluation of the effects of various regulations on the willingness of private school leaders to 
participate in voucher programs. This study also is the first to provide empirical estimates of the 
size of the effects of specific regulations on the intension to participate in voucher programs, a 
vital issue in the school choice policymaking process. We randomly assign a hypothetical 
voucher program participation offer to 3,080 private school leaders in Florida in 2018. 
Specifically, we randomly assign one of three different regulations – or no additional 
government regulation at all – to each of these private school leaders in Florida and ask them 
whether they would participate in the voucher program the next year. The findings presented in 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3273428 
4 
 
this study suggest that the types of regulations levied on a private school choice program can 
reduce the likelihood of private school participation. In particular, we find that open-enrollment 
requirements that prevent private schools from being selective in their admissions practices, and 
requirements that private schools administer standardized tests to their students, reduce the 
likelihood that private school leaders elect to have their school participate in a given voucher 
program. The open-enrollment regulation decreases the likelihood that private school leaders are 
“certain to participate” by around 17 percentage points and standardized testing requirements 
decrease the likelihood that private school leaders are “certain to participate” by around 11 
percentage points. Although all coefficients are in the expected direction for the prohibition of 
parental copayment, none of the results for this particular regulation are statistically significant. 
In the next section, we examine the theory underlying private school choice participation 
decisions. Then we review the scant empirical literature on the question. After that, we describe 
our data and methods. Since this is the first study of its kind, we spend several sections 
discussing its data and methods in detail. We then present our empirical results, including an 
exploration of possible heterogeneous effects. Our final section concludes.   
Theory 
When deciding whether to participate in a private school choice program, private school leaders 
weigh additional benefits against the additional costs associated with participation. The major 
benefit associated with school choice program participation is additional funding and enrollment. 
On the cost side of the equation is additional regulation. In theory, raising the costs associated 
with entering private school choice programs should reduce the likelihood that individual schools 
participate in those programs. After all, rational private school leaders will only turn down the 
offer if they perceive that additional costs will exceed additional benefits of participation. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3273428 
5 
 
 Based on this cost-benefit decision-making model, we expect that – relative to zero 
additional regulations – all forms of private school choice regulations will significantly reduce 
the likelihood that private school leaders decide to participate. We expect that all three 
regulations that we randomly assign – open-enrollment mandates, state standardized testing 
requirements, and the prohibition of copayment – should all be costly enough to deter private 
schools from participating in programs. Because autonomy is highly valued by private school 
leaders and families, and because many private schools already use standardized tests, we expect 
that the random-based admissions regulation will have the strongest negative effects on program 
participation. Because many private schools in the U.S. are struggling to maintain a financially 
viable enrollment level (Brinig & Garnett, 2014; Murnane, Reardon, Mbekeani, & Lamb, 2018), 
we are less optimistic that the prohibition of copayment will impact the intentions of principals 
to participate or not in school voucher programs. 
 Private school leaders are not the only people making decisions regarding the enactment 
and launch of a private school choice program. Policymakers and advocacy organizations also 
decide which school choice regulations they will support or oppose. Moreover, the regulatory 
regimes surrounding private school choice programs often are reshaped by policymakers over 
time (Wolf, 2012). As shown in the next section, policymakers have been making those crucial 
decisions without the assistance of any causal evidence of the effects of specific choice 
regulations on the supply side of this widespread market intervention. 
Literature Review 
As Chubb and Moe (1990), Hess (2010), and McShane (2015) have all identified, the success of 
the private school marketplace relies on the ability of high-quality private schools to open and 
expand. However, very little empirical research exists that links government regulations to 
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private school choice program participation, perhaps because there is not a significant amount of 
variation in regulations across programs in the United States. Because of this weak variation, and 
because voucher program regulations are not randomly assigned to private schools in the United 
States, no causal studies exist on the topic. Although no true experiments exist, there are a few 
empirical studies that offer suggestive evidence that regulations can have unintended effects on 
the effectiveness of voucher programs. 
 The first experimental evaluations in the world to find negative effects of a private school 
choice program on student achievement were of the Louisiana voucher program 
(Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters, 2018; Mills, 2015; Mills & Wolf, 2017). Abdulkadiroglu, 
Pathak, and Walters (2018) found that lower quality private schools – as measured by student 
enrollment – were more likely to participate in the LSP. They further suggested that the low 
quality of private schools participating in the program could have led to the negative test score 
effects. Other researchers found that lower quality private schools – as measured by tuition and 
enrollment levels – were more likely to participate in the program (Sude, DeAngelis, & Wolf, 
2018). Only a third of the private schools in the highly regulated Louisiana Scholarship Program 
(LSP) chose to participate, while less regulated programs enjoyed much higher participation 
rates (Sude, DeAngelis, & Wolf, 2018). DeAngelis and Hoarty (2018) largely confirmed the 
findings of Sude, DeAngelis, and Wolf, while adding customer reviews as a third measure of 
private school quality negatively predictive of participation in a voucher program. 
 Similarly, Stuit and Doan (2013) found that higher levels of U.S. voucher program 
regulatory burdens are associated with less private school participation. Kisida, Wolf, and 
Rhinesmith (2015) surveyed private school leaders in Louisiana, Indiana, and Florida, and found 
that voucher program regulations are a major concern. In fact, 100 percent of the private school 
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leaders participating in the Louisiana voucher program are concerned about future regulations in 
general, while about two-thirds of the leaders indicate that the future regulations are a “major 
concern.” In addition, 86 percent of the private school leaders in the LSP – which mandates 
open-enrollment – indicate that they are concerned that the incoming scholarship students may 
be unprepared for the academic rigor of their school. Moreover, 74 percent of non-participating 
private schools in Louisiana list academic preparation as a main reason for electing not to 
participate, while only 14 percent to 42 percent list academic preparation as an influential factor 
in Florida and Indiana – where private schools are not required to use random-based admissions. 
DeAngelis and Burke (2017; forthcoming) find evidence to suggest that heavy packages of 
voucher program regulations could homogenize the supply of schools overall, as private schools 
begin to operate more like regular public schools after voucher programs are enacted.  
 While the existing studies provide some evidence that regulations could reduce program 
participation, none of these studies are true experiments. We fill this hole in the literature by 
conducting the first random-assignment study on the effects of regulation on the expressed 
intentions of private school leaders to participate or not in school choice programs. We randomly 
assign one of three regulations – or a control condition – to 3,080 private school leaders in 
Florida and ask them whether they would participate in such a program in the following school 
year. 
Data and Research Design 
We obtained a complete list of 3,080 individual private schools in May of 2018 using the Florida 
Private Schools Directory located at the Florida Department of Education’s website.
1
 This data 
source provided us with contact information for the private school leaders and school 
                                                     
1
 Florida Private Schools Directory. Office of Independent Education and Parental Choice. Florida Department of 
Education. Retrieved from 
http://www.floridaschoolchoice.org/information/PrivateSchoolDirectory/DownloadExcelFile.aspx. 
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background characteristics such as whether they participated in the McKay, FTC, or Gardiner 
private school choice programs and whether the schools had religious affiliations.  
We randomly assigned each private school to one of four groups using the complete list. 
Each of the four groups received a different survey, but the only difference across the four 
surveys was the note in the final question (Q10). The first nine questions were identical and 
asked basic school and leader background characteristics that were used as control variables. The 
control group’s tenth question asked “If Florida launched a new school choice program next 
academic year, with a value of $6,000 per student, per year, how likely is it that your school 
would participate in the program? Note: This program would not require any changes in school 
operations or additional government regulations.” The first treatment group, capturing the effect 
of standardized testing requirements on program participation, had a note on question ten 
indicating “The only requirement would be that every student would have to take the state 
standardized tests each year.” The second treatment group, capturing the effect of open-
enrollment policy, had a note on question ten indicating “The only requirement would be that 
your school would have to accept all students who applied (and you would be required to use 
random lottery for admissions in the case of oversubscription).” The third treatment group, 
capturing the effect of a copayment prohibition, had a note on question ten indicating “The only 
requirement would be that your school would have to accept the voucher amount ($6,000) as full 
payment for voucher students.” The full survey instrument can be found in Appendix B. 
Out of the complete list of 3,080 schools, we assigned 779 to the control group (no 
regulations), 767 to the mandated standardized testing treatment, 751 to the open-enrollment 
treatment, and 783 to the copay prohibition treatment (Table 1). Because of duplicates and 
bounced emails, we were able to send out 750 emails to the control group, 743 emails to the 
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testing group, 720 emails to the open-enrollment group, and 745 emails to the copay prohibition 
group for a total potential sample size of 2,958 private schools. We sent initial emails on May 
29
th
 2018 at 9:27am ET, first reminders on June 1
st
 2018 at 1:37pm ET, second reminders on 
June 5
th
 2018 at 1:32pm ET, and final reminders on June 13
th
 2018 at 1:32pm ET.  
We received 327 total survey responses by August 15
th
 2018 for a total response rate of 
11.05 percent. As shown in Table 1 below, the testing and prohibited copay treatment groups’ 
response rates were not statistically different from the control group’s response rate. However, 
the response rate for the open-enrollment treatment (8.61 percent) was statistically different from 
the control group’s response rate (12.27 percent) at the 95 percent level of confidence. 
Furthermore, the rate at which the entire survey was completed (surveys completed divided by 
surveys started) for the open-enrollment treatment (51.67 percent) was statistically different from 
the control group’s completion rate (70.77 percent) at the 99 percent level of confidence. 
Internal Validity 
In theory, the differential response rate for the open-enrollment group could introduce bias into 
the analysis if the leaders opted out of responding to that survey based on unobservable 
characteristics. However, the most plausible reason for leaders to opt out of the open-enrollment 
survey at higher rates has to do with the potential for strong social desirability bias (Phillips & 
Clancy, 1972). If the school leader perceived that the survey results would be published online 
(although we assured them that their individual responses would be kept completely 
confidential), they would have an incentive to avoid responding to the open-enrollment survey if 
their school did not want to take all students at random. Even if the individual school leader had 
good intentions, a response indicating that they did not want to use random lottery admissions 
could be bad publicity because the categorical response does not allow for a nuanced discussion 
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of the actual policy. This social desirability bias would not be as likely to deter leaders that 
would accept all students from taking the survey. This type of bias would also not be as likely to 
deter leaders in the control group from opting out of the survey, as school leaders presumably 
would perceive little if any negative connotation associated with not wanting to participate in a 
school choice program without any regulations.  
If this is the case, then the bias introduced into the results for open-enrollment would be 
upwards in direction, meaning the obtained rate of “yes” responses to participating is higher than 
the true rate would be in the absence of non-response. This upward bias in the “yes” responses 
would make it more difficult to detect the theorized negative effect of regulation on program 
participation. This means that any negative detected effects for the open-enrollment regulatory 
treatment could be lower bounds of the true estimates. This theory is strengthened by the fact 
that all three treatment groups had survey start rates (surveys started divided by emails sent) that 
were not statistically different from the control group at any significance level. In other words, 
while the same percent of school leaders started surveys in each treatment block, something 
about the open-enrollment treatment group’s survey might have deterred the leaders from 
submitting or completing the survey. The best explanation for this occurrence is the potential 
social desirability bias introduced by the randomly assigned note regarding open-enrollment. The 
very fact that the surveys with the open-enrollment regulation randomly assigned were 
completed and returned at significantly lower rates demonstrates that private school leaders are 
especially sensitive to that specific school choice regulation.  
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Table 1: Response Rates by Experimental Group 
Distribution Control Testing Open-Enrollment Copay 
Assigned 779 767 751 783 
Emailed 750 743 720 745 
Surveys Started 130 144 120 135 
Responded 92 92 62 81 
Start Rate 17.33% 19.38% 16.67% 18.12% 
Response Rate 12.27% 12.38% 8.61% * 10.87% 
Completion Rate 70.77% 63.88% 51.67% ** 60.00% + 
Notes: + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Statistical significance was calculated using a chi-
squared test for each treatment column. 
 
One way to test for potential bias arising from differential response rates is to check for 
equivalence on observable characteristics. As shown in Table 2 below, individual t-tests do not 
detect any differences across any of the 21 observable characteristics between the treatment and 
control groups at the 95 percent level of confidence. Two marginally significant results emerge, 
but these could very well be type I errors; because there are 21 observable characteristics, and 
because type I errors occur 10 percent of the time, by definition, we can confidently expect about 
2 type I errors to exist in each treatment column of Table 2, or 6 total. Importantly, only one of 
the two marginally significant difference emerged for the open-enrollment treatment group that 
had a response rate that was statistically different from the control group’s response rate. In other 
words, Table 2 demonstrates strong evidence that randomization worked and, therefore, that our 
estimates are unbiased. That said, we also provide results from models using all control 
variables. 
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Table 2: Equivalence on Observables 
Observable Control Testing Open-Enrollment No Copay 
Religious School 0.59 0.63 0.61 0.44  + 
Regular School 0.49 0.53 0.55 0.40 
Alternative School 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.16 
Specialized School 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.12   
Montessori School 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.10 
Early Childhood School 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.12 
SPED School 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.10 
Accepts FTC 0.74 0.73 0.68 0.64 
Accepts McKay 0.62 0.66 0.68 0.63 
Accepts Gardiner 0.49 0.58 0.55 0.53 
Enrollment 244 172 171 169 
Tuition ($) 8106 9496 10024  + 9305 
Principal 0.49 0.53 0.56 0.40 
Administrator 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.22 
Director 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.33 
Other Leader 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.05 
Female 0.73 0.75 0.69 0.78 
Black 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.20 
Hispanic 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.17 
Asian 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 
White 0.63 0.65 0.68 0.62 
N 92 92 62 81 
Notes: + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Statistical significance was calculated using a t-test    
for each treatment column. 
External Validity 
Although we do not find evidence to suggest a problem of internal validity, a low overall 
response rate of 11.05 percent may limit the external validity of our results. Our sample of 
respondents might not be representative of the entire population of private school leaders in 
Florida, so the results might not be generalizable to all Florida private schools. However, we do 
have access to some observable characteristics for all schools on the list of 3,080 private schools 
from the Florida Department of Education website. As shown in Table 3 below, out of the 
observable characteristics that we have for respondents’ schools and all schools – whether the 
school is accredited, whether the school has a religious affiliation, whether the school 
participates in the FTC, Gardiner, or McKay programs, and the city and county in which the 
school is located – only one statistically significant difference emerges between the sample of 
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respondents and the total private school population in Florida and two marginally significant 
differences are detected at p < 0.10. At the 95 percent level of confidence, the respondents’ 
schools in our sample are 5.6 percentage points less likely to be located in Dade County than the 
average private school in the state. At the marginal level of significance, respondents’ schools 
are 4.8 percentage points more likely to accept McKay funding and 4.3 percentage points more 
likely to be accredited than the average private school in the state. Descriptive statistics of the 
full sample can be found in Table 4 below. 
 





Population (#) Population (%) 
Religious School 186 56.88 1681 54.58 
Accepts FTC 229 70.03 2043 66.33 
Accepts McKay 211 64.53  + 1839 59.71 
Accepts Gardiner 175 53.52 1532 47.74 
Accredited 97 29.66  + 780 25.32 
Dade (County) 55 16.82  * 689 22.37 
Broward (County) 27 8.26 300 9.74 
Orange (County) 23 7.03 245 7.95 
Duval (County) 19 5.81 186 6.04 
Hillsborough (County) 19 5.81 165 5.36 
Palm Beach (County) 15 4.59 142 4.61 
Pinellas (County) 8 2.45 110 3.57 
Miami (City) 31 9.48 358 11.62 
Orlando (City) 18 5.50 183 5.94 
Jacksonville (City) 18 5.50 171 5.55 
Tampa (City) 10 3.06 104 3.38 
Kissimmee (City) 9 2.75 63 2.05 
N 327 327 3080 3080 
Notes: + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Statistical significance was calculated using a chi-
squared test. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max N 
Participation Number 3.43 1.35 1 5 327 
Certain to Participate 0.25 0.43 0 1 327 
Female 0.74 0.44 0 1 327 
Black 0.17 0.38 0 1 327 
Hispanic 0.16 0.37 0 1 327 
White 0.64 0.48 0 1 327 
Principal 0.49 0.50 0 1 327 
Director 0.26 0.44 0 1 327 
Regular School 0.49 0.50 0 1 327 
SPED School 0.13 0.33 0 1 327 
Specialized School 0.08 0.27 0 1 327 
Religious School 0.57 0.50 0 1 327 
FTC 0.70 0.46 0 1 327 
McKay 0.65 0.48 0 1 327 
Gardiner 0.54 0.50 0 1 327 
Tuition ($) 9156 7697 0 78000 319 
Enrollment 192 456 0 7000 325 
 
Methods 
We employ an ordered probit regression approach of the form: 
Prob (Participationi2018) = β0 + β1Testi2018 + β2Open_Enrolli2018 + β3No_Copayi2018 + β3Xi2018 + εit 
Where the categorical dependent variable of interest Participation captures school leader i’s 
expectation of participation in a hypothetical private school choice program in 2018. The 
dependent variable is the private school leader’s response on survey question 10, a Likert Scale 
ordered from one to five, with one indicating that the leader is “certain not to participate” and 
five indicating that the leader is “certain to participate.” We use ordered probit regression (and 
ordered logit regression as a robustness check) because the dependent variable of interest is 
ordered and categorical. When interpreting marginal effects, we focus on the relative likelihoods 
of private school leaders to choose the fifth outcome category (“certain to participate”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3273428 
15 
 
 Because effective random assignment eliminates the need for controls, the base model 
only includes the three treatment indicators as independent variables. The first binary 
independent variable of interest, Testing, takes on the value of one if the private school, i, was 
randomly assigned a state standardized testing mandate in the note of question 10, and zero 
otherwise. The second binary independent variable of interest, Open_Enroll, takes on the value 
of one if the private school was randomly assigned a random-admissions mandate, and zero 
otherwise. The third binary independent variable of interest, No_Copay, takes on the value of 
one if the private school was randomly assigned a mandate stating that the school had to take the 
voucher funding as full-payment, and zero otherwise. We expect the coefficients on all three of 
these independent variables to be negative, indicating that these regulations reduce the likelihood 
of participation in private school choice programs. 
Random assignment alone does not absolutely guarantee that all endogeneity will be 
removed from the models. Because of this possibility, we also include models with vector X of 
observable control variables as robustness checks. These models control for the gender, race, and 
position of all respondents, school type, tuition, enrollment, whether the school is religious, and 
whether the school participates in the FTC, McKay, or Gardiner private school choice programs. 
Our main specification uses multiple-imputation for 2 missing enrollment responses (0.62 
percent of the analytic sample) and 8 missing tuition responses (2.46 percent of the analytic 
sample). Enders (2003) points out that missing data rates for education studies are regularly 
much higher than ours – between 15 and 20 percent. While there is not an exact cutoff for when 
the percentage of missing data becomes unacceptable, Schafer (1999) claims that missing rates 
below 5 percent are inconsequential, while Bennett (2001) contends that estimates are biased 
with missing rates exceeding 10 percent. Our multiple-imputation approach uses all other 
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independent variables to impute missing tuition and enrollment data (Rubin, 1987). As shown in 
Table A1 in Appendix A, the results using multiple-imputation are robust to models using 
listwise deletion for the observations with missing values. 
Results 
Although all coefficients are in the expected direction, indicating that regulation reduces 
program participation, only the effects of two of the three regulations are statistically significant. 
The strongest and most precise negative effects appear for the open-enrollment regulation 
mandating that participating private schools admit all students on a random basis. Depending on 
the specification, our results indicate that, relative to no restrictions, open-enrollment regulation 
reduces the likelihood that private school leaders are “certain to participate” by around 17.4 to 21 
percentage points, or 70 to 84 percent. These negative effects on participation are large, as they 
are around 40 to 49 percent of a standard deviation. 
 Each model also detects negative effects for state standardized testing requirements. 
Depending on the model employed, we find that mandated standardized testing using the official 
state accountability test reduces the likelihood private school leaders are “certain to participate” 
by 11.6 to 13.7 percentage points, or about 46 to 55 percent. These effects are moderate in size, 
as they are equivalent to a 27 to 32 percent of a standard deviation reduction in certain program 
participation. While all of the coefficients measuring the effects of the prohibition of copayment 
on participation are negative, none of them are statistically significant even at the marginal p-
value < 10 percent level. 
 The few statistically significant control variable effects are also worth noting. As found 
by Sude, DeAngelis, and Wolf (2018), higher tuition schools in our sample are less likely to 
participate, all else equal. In our sample, a $1,000 increase in tuition is associated with around a 
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0.63-percentage point, or about a 2.52 percent, reduction in certain program participation, 
suggesting that higher quality (or at least more expensive) schools are less likely to participate in 
private school choice programs. Black school leaders are 16-percentage points more likely to be 
certain to participate than white leaders, and Hispanic school leaders are 29-percentage points 
more likely to be certain to participate than white leaders. We do not find any evidence to 
suggest that expected participation differs by school type or by leader position or gender.  
Table 5: Effects of Regulations on Reported Participation (11.05% Response Rate) 
 
 Participation Participation Participation Participation 
 (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) 
Standardized Testing -0.137** -0.137** -0.116** -0.116* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) 
     
Open-Enrollment -0.210*** -0.196*** -0.174*** -0.178*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Copay Prohibition -0.061 -0.067 -0.038 -0.044 
 (0.199) (0.148) (0.374) (0.302) 
     
Controls No No Yes Yes 
     
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0174 0.0157 0.0912 0.0913 
N  327 327 327 327 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Average marginal effects are 
reported for the last outcome category of “certain to participate.” Models in the last two columns use 
controls for the gender, race, and position of respondents, school type, tuition, enrollment, whether the 
school is religious, and whether the school participates in the FTC, McKay, or Gardiner private school 
choice programs. The last two columns use multiple-imputation for 2 missing enrollment values and 8 
missing tuition values. As shown in Table A1 in Appendix A, these results are robust to models that drop 
the 10 observations with either missing tuition or enrollment values. 
  
As shown in Table 6 below, the outcome category examined does not change the results. All 
effects are statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level for standardized test scores and open-
enrollment across all five response categories. For example, the open-enrollment regulation 
increases the likelihood that private school leaders are “certain not to participate” by around 12 
percentage points and state standardized testing requirements increase the likelihood that private 
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school leaders are “certain not to participate” by around 8 percentage points. All categories are 
statistically insignificant for the prohibition of parental copayment.  
 
Table 6: Effects of Regulations on Reported Participation by Category (11.05% Response Rate) 
 








Standardized Testing 0.080* 0.034* 0.029* -0.028* -0.116** 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.030) (0.009) 
      
Open-Enrollment 0.121*** 0.052** 0.044*** -0.042** -0.174*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) 
      
Copay Prohibition 0.027 0.011 0.010 -0.009 -0.038 
 (0.372) (0.384) (0.382) (0.385) (0.374) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0912 0.0912 0.0912 0.0912 0.0912 
N  327 327 327 327 327 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Average marginal effects are 
reported for the last outcome category of “certain to participate.” All models employ ordered probit 
regression and use controls for the gender, race, and position of respondents, school type, tuition, 
enrollment, whether the school is religious, and whether the school participates in the FTC, McKay, or 
Gardiner private school choice programs. All models use multiple imputation for 2 missing enrollment 
values and 8 missing tuition values. As shown in Table A1 in Appendix A, these results are robust to 




Regulations could most deter higher-quality schools from participating in private school choice 
programs. Lower-quality private schools may be more likely to participate in voucher programs 
– regardless of the additional regulations – because they are more likely to be desperate for 
financial resources and enrollment. On the other hand, higher-quality private schools may be less 
likely to accept voucher regulations if they perceive that the additional regulations might alter the 
educational models that are already working for their students and in demand by their paying 
customers. Four empirical evaluations have found that higher quality private schools – as 
measured by tuition, enrollment, and customer reviews – are less likely to participate in voucher 
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programs in Chile and across the U.S. (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, & Walters, 2018; DeAngelis & 
Hoarty, 2018; Sánchez, 2018; Sude, DeAngelis, & Wolf, 2018). However, none of these studies 
are able to determine whether regulations – or other factors – deterred higher-quality private 
schools from participating in voucher programs. 
 Table 7 below reports the first causal evidence regarding the question of whether 
regulations are more likely to deter higher-quality private schools than lower-quality ones from 
voucher program participation. Each of the four models uses an interaction term for each of the 
three regulations and private school tuition (in thousands of U.S. dollars). The clearest result – 
across all four models – is that higher-quality schools – as measured by tuition – are more likely 
to be deterred by the regulation that mandates that all schools take the voucher amount as full 
payment. This result is intuitive, as it is much more costly for a school with tuition of $20,000 to 
take a $6,000 voucher as full-payment than for a school with tuition of $10,000 to do so. The 
more conservative estimate – from the model using all control variables – suggests that a $1,000 
increase in tuition is associated with a 1.3 percentage point larger negative effect of copay 
prohibition on voucher program participation. 
 The model using all controls also finds that higher-quality schools are more likely to be 
deterred by state standardized testing regulations. Specifically, we find that a $1,000 increase in 
tuition is associated with a 1.4 percentage point larger negative effect of a state standardized 
testing mandate on intended voucher program participation.  
As expected, all coefficients are negative for the open-enrollment regulation, indicating 
that higher-quality schools are more likely to be deterred by a random admissions mandate; 
however, only one of the four models (the probit specification without additional control 
variables) has a result that is marginally statistically significant at a p-value of 0.097, indicating 
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that a $1,000 increase in tuition is associated with a 1.4 percentage point larger negative effect of 
open-enrollment on voucher program participation. 
 Table 8 shows results based on the historical enrollment trends within Florida private 
schools from the 2013-14 school year to the 2015-16 school year as reported by the Private 
School Universe Survey (PSS). As shown by the experimental voucher program evaluation by 
Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Walters (2018), schools experiencing declining enrollment tend to 
be lower-quality based on their effects on student achievement. A school’s enrollment trend over 
time is a proxy for school quality because it demonstrates the change in demand for the 
educational services offered by the school. Because several of the private schools in our analysis 
were not included in the PSS for both years, the analyses in Table 8 can only use 50 percent of 
the original 327 school-level observations.  
These results also indicate that higher-quality private schools are more likely to be 
deterred by voucher program regulations. Specifically, columns 1 and 3 indicate that a 10-
percentage point increase in enrollment growth between 2013-14 and 2015-16 is associated with 
a 2-percentage point larger negative effect of the open-enrollment regulation on program 
participation. Column 2 indicates that a 10-percentage point increase in enrollment growth 
between 2013-14 and 2015-2016 is associated with a 2-percentage point larger negative effect of 
the state standardized testing regulation on program participation. However, these results are 
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Table 7: Effects of Regulations on Reported Participation by Tuition (11.05% Response Rate) 
 
 Participation Participation Participation Participation 
 (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) 
Standardized Testing  -0.011 -0.012 -0.014* -0.015+ 
 (0.120) (0.153) (0.045) (0.075) 
     
Open-Enrollment -0.014+ -0.013 -0.011 -0.009 
 (0.097) (0.108) (0.148) (0.196) 
     
Copay Prohibition -0.017* -0.016* -0.013+ -0.012+ 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.056) (0.093) 
     
Controls No No Yes Yes 
     
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0353 0.0340 0.0951 0.0949 
N  327 327 327 327 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Average marginal effects are 
reported for the last outcome category of “certain to participate.” All 3 independent variables of interest 
are interacted with reported private school tuition (in thousands of U.S. dollars). Models in the first two 
columns control for tuition. Models in the last two columns also use controls for the gender, race, and 
position of respondents, school type, enrollment, whether the school is religious, and whether the school 
participates in the FTC, McKay, or Gardiner private school choice programs. All columns use multiple-
imputation for 2 missing enrollment values and 8 missing tuition values. 
 
Table 8: Effects of Regulations on Reported Participation by Enrollment Change (11.05%) 
 
 Participation Participation Participation Participation 
 (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) 
Standardized Testing  -0.002 -0.002+ -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.109)  (0.073) (0.203) (0.251) 
     
Open-Enrollment -0.002+ -0.002 -0.002+ -0.002 
 (0.088) (0.193) (0.059) (0.177) 
     
Copay Prohibition 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.103) (0.149) (0.122) (0.199) 
     
Controls No No Yes Yes 
     
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0390 0.0375 0.1251 0.1327 
N  163 163 163 163 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Average marginal effects are 
reported for the last outcome category of “certain to participate.” All 3 independent variables of interest 
are interacted with reported private school enrollment change from the 2013-14 school year to the 2015-
16 school year as reported by the Private School Universe Survey. Models in the first two columns 
exclude controls. Models in the last two columns use controls for the gender, race, and position of 
respondents, school type, tuition, enrollment, whether the school is religious, and whether the school 
participates in the FTC, McKay, or Gardiner private school choice programs. The last two columns use 
multiple-imputation for 2 missing enrollment values and 8 missing tuition values. 
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Conclusions and Discussion 
This study has important limitations. Even though the data collection instrument was 
administered in the field, the study was designed as a lab experiment (Blom-Hansen, Morton & 
Serritzlew, 2015). Participants were presented with a hypothetical situation and asked to describe 
their likely behavioral response. To the extent that the hypothetical situation – in this case a 
private school voucher program with an average voucher amount and a randomly assigned 
regulatory framework – did not seem real to them, their responses may not reflect how they 
would behave when making an actual private school choice participation decision. Only 11 
percent of private school principals in Florida responded to the survey. Respondents were similar 
to non-respondents on descriptive characteristics of their schools. To the extent that non-
response bias may be influencing our results, it is likely biasing them towards zero for the one 
category of respondents (assigned the open-enrollment requirement) in which we observe the 
largest and most consistently significant negative effects. Finally, our study examined the effect 
of a single government regulation on the intention of private school leaders to participate or not 
in a school voucher program. Most voucher programs have a multi-regulation framework that 
combines various requirements. How leaders might respond to more complex regulatory 
arrangements is a vital question requiring additional experimental research to answer 
definitively.     
The findings presented in this study suggest that some types of regulations levied on a 
private school choice program have a negative impact on the likelihood of private school 
participation. In particular, we find that regulations that would prevent private schools from 
being selective in their admissions practices as a result of open-enrollment requirements, and 
regulations requiring private schools to administer official state standardized tests to their 
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students, significantly reduce the likelihood that private school leaders will elect to have their 
school participate in a given voucher program. As noted above, the open-enrollment regulation 
decreases the likelihood that private school leaders are “certain to participate” by around 17 
percentage points and state standardized testing requirements decrease the likelihood that private 
school leaders are “certain to participate” by around 11 percentage points. All general findings 
are statistically insignificant for the prohibition of parental copayment.  
Open-Enrollment Regulation  
One possible explanation for the significant negative effect of open-enrollment regulations on 
private school participation in a school choice program is the concern that such regulations 
would ultimately limit a school’s ability to serve a particular mission or focus. Again, the open-
enrollment question asked respondents if they would participate in a school choice program and 
“the only requirement would be that your school would have to accept all students who applied 
(and you would be required to use random lottery for admissions in the case of 
oversubscription).” Private schools tend to operate as intentional communities built upon a belief 
system and a code of conduct (Trivitt & Wolf, 2011; Cheng, Trivitt & Wolf, 2016). Families 
select into private schools, and in some cases, do so precisely because the school has a code of 
conduct and a belief system that aligns with their own. Many private schools specialize and 
operate as single sex schools, schools that serve students with specific special needs, and 
religious schools, among many other specializations. A perceived limitation on a school leader’s 
ability to restrict admissions to students who adhere to the school’s mission or focus may have 
been seen as more of an existential threat to school autonomy than other regulations, such as the 
theoretical prohibition on parental co-pay. Our results suggest that private school leaders are 
more protective of their school mission than they are of their school finances.   
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Standardized Testing Regulation  
The statistically significant negative effect on program participation as a result of a hypothetical 
state standardized testing regulation adds to a body of literature that suggests private school 
leaders have considerable concerns about the impact such requirements can have on school 
curricular autonomy. The curriculum used by a given private school may not be aligned in 
content or topical sequencing to state assessments for public schools, and as such, those 
assessments may not paint an accurate portrait of what students in a private setting have learned. 
In order to ensure students perform well on state standardized tests, private schools may then feel 
compelled to align their curriculum with the state test, ultimately limiting one of the major 
differentiating facets of their schools (Cunningham, 2014). As Greene (2016) has identified, test-
induced curriculum narrowing, which tends to focus curriculum on mathematics and reading, can 
“short-change the broader knowledge that is the key to academic success later” (pg.1). Moreover, 
most private schools already administer some form of norm-referenced test, making additional 
testing requirements redundant and adding to the bureaucratic compliance burden for school 
leaders. 
Copay Prohibition Regulation 
Some state-based voucher programs have instituted tuition caps or price controls in an effort to 
ensure access to private education options, prohibiting schools from charging tuition and fees in 
excess of the voucher amount. The hypothetical tuition cap regulation randomly assigned to a 
group of participants in this study may not have had a significant negative impact on their 
likelihood of school choice program participation because the respondents were heading existing, 
established schools. With their fixed costs in the rear-view mirror, these private school leaders 
likely were focused on their marginal costs of educating one more student, which may have been 
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close to and even below the $6,000 voucher cap in the hypothetical.  As Carden and Merrifield 
(2016) find, however, capping tuition could distort the market and discourage private schools 
from expanding. Such caps, they note, create a disconnect between the statutory purchase price 
allowed in a given choice program and what families are actually willing to pay. Tuition caps, 
therefore, may be a greater deterrent to school expansions and new entrants into the market, 
while having less of a negative impact on the willingness of existing, established private schools 
to participate in a given voucher program, especially in the current private school market with 
shrinking demand from paying customers. More research is needed on this topic. 
Considerations for Policymakers 
Policymakers interested in maximizing the number and type of private schools that participate in 
school voucher programs should consider the extent to which certain regulations act as deterrents 
to private school participation. In particular, regulations requiring participating private schools to 
have open admissions procedures and administer standardized tests could significantly reduce 
the number of private schools willing to participate. Overly burdensome regulations can impede 
diversity of school supply, limiting the ability of private schools to respond to community 
preferences in a way that meets family needs and local demands (Berends, Goldring, Stein, & 
Cravens, 2010). As McShane (2018) argues, although regulators seek to protect students from 
harm, they could also act as a barrier to innovation and improvement. Any regulation, no matter 
how desirable, comes at some cost. Policymakers should consider all of the potential costs and 
benefits of program regulations when deciding how to structure private school choice programs. 
In addition, policymakers should note that the research on this topic is severely limited. More 
efforts to research the intersection between school choice program participation and regulation 
would be especially welcome. 
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Appendix A: Supplemental Tables 
Table A1: Effects of Regulations on Reported Participation (11.05% Response Rate) 
 
 Participation Participation Participation Participation 
 (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) 
Standardized Testing -0.137** -0.137** -0.114** -0.113* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) 
     
Open-Enrollment -0.210*** -0.196*** -0.173*** -0.176*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
     
Copay Prohibition -0.061 -0.067 -0.035 -0.040 
 (0.199) (0.148) (0.429) (0.360) 
     
Controls No No Yes Yes 
     
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0174 0.0157 0.0927 0.0930 
N  327 327 317 317 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Average marginal effects are 
reported for the last outcome category of “certain to participate.” Models in the last two columns use 
controls for the gender, race, and position of respondents, school type, tuition, enrollment, whether the 
school is religious, and whether the school participates in the FTC, McKay, or Gardiner private school 
choice programs. The last two columns drop 10 observations because 2 are missing enrollment values and 


























 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3273428 
31 
 
Table A2: Standardized Effect Sizes (11.05% Response Rate) 
 
 Participation Participation Participation Participation 
 (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) 
Standardized Testing -0.319** -0.319** -0.270** -0.270* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) 
     
Open-Enrollment -0.488*** -0.456*** -0.405*** -0.414*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Copay Prohibition -0.142 -0.156 -0.088 -0.102 
 (0.199) (0.148) (0.374) (0.302) 
     
Controls No No Yes Yes 
     
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0174 0.0157 0.0912 0.0913 
N  327 327 327 327 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standardized effect sizes are 
reported for the last outcome category of “certain to participate.” Models in the last two columns use 
controls for the gender, race, and position of respondents, school type, tuition, enrollment, whether the 
school is religious, and whether the school participates in the FTC, McKay, or Gardiner private school 
choice programs. The last two columns use multiple-imputation for 2 missing enrollment values and 8 
missing tuition values. As shown in Table A1 in the Appendix, these results are robust to models that 
drop the 10 observations with either missing tuition or enrollment values. 
 
 
Table A3: Effects of Regulations on Reported Participation (7.54% Response Rate) 
 
 Participation Participation Participation Participation 
 (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) 
Standardized Testing -0.072 -0.078 -0.062 -0.072 
 (0.234) (0.206) (0.263) (0.182) 
     
Open-Enrollment -0.204** -0.191** -0.150* -0.159* 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.021) (0.012) 
     
Copay Prohibition -0.074 -0.084 -0.060 -0.071 
 (0.214) (0.161) (0.322) (0.242) 
     
Controls No No Yes Yes 
     
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0143 0.0123 0.0956 0.1008 
N  223 223 218 218 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Average marginal effects are 
reported for the last outcome category of “certain to participate.” Models in the last two columns use 
controls for the gender, race, and position of respondents, school type, tuition, enrollment, whether the 
school is religious, and whether the school participates in the FTC, McKay, or Gardiner private school 
choice programs. The last two columns drop 5 observations because of missing enrollment and tuition 
values. 
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Table A4: Effects of Regulations on Reported Participation (5.48% Response Rate) 
 
 Participation Participation Participation Participation 
 (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) 
Standardized Testing -0.133* -0.140* -0.136* -0.142* 
 (0.050) (0.037) (0.026) (0.020) 
     
Open-Enrollment -0.238** -0.225** -0.176* -0.174* 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.023) (0.024) 
     
Copay Prohibition -0.085 -0.091 -0.054 -0.045 
 (0.225) (0.189) (0.452) (0.517) 
     
Controls No No Yes Yes 
     
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0197 0.0184 0.0888 0.0930 
N  162 162 158 158 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Average marginal effects are 
reported for the last outcome category of “certain to participate.” Models in the last two columns use 
controls for the gender, race, and position of respondents, school type, tuition, enrollment, whether the 
school is religious, and whether the school participates in the FTC, McKay, or Gardiner private school 
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Appendix B: Survey Instrument 
Control Group 
Q1: What is your first name? 
Q2: What is your last name? 
Q3: What is the name of your school? 




 Other Leader 
Q5: Please describe your race/ethnicity 
 White or Caucasian 
 Black or African American 
 Hispanic or Latino 
 Asian or Asian American 
 American Indian or Alaska Native 
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
Another race/ethnicity 
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Q7: Which of the following best describes this school or program? 
 Regular school 
 Montessori school 
 Special  program emphasis school (such as science or math school, performing arts 
schools, talented or gifted school, etc.) 
 Special education school (primarily serves students with disabilities) 
 Career/Technical/Vocational school (primarily serves students being trained for 
occupations) 
 Early childhood program or day care center (such as kindergarten only, prekindergarten 
and kindergarten only, day care and transitional kindergarten only, etc.) 
 Alternative / other school (offers a curriculum designed to provide alternative or 
nontraditional education; does not specifically fall into the other categories listed) 
Q8: What is your school’s total enrollment? 
Q9: What is the highest level of tuition charged at your school (In U.S. dollars)? 
Q10: If Florida launched a new school choice program next academic year, with a value of 
$6,000 per student, per year, how likely is it that your school would participate in the program? 
Note: This program would not require any changes in school operations or additional 
government regulations 
Certain not to participate 
Very little chance 
Some chance 
Very good chance 
Certain to participate 
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Treatment Group One 
Exactly the same as Control Group, but the note on Q10 says “The only requirement would be 
that every student would have to take the state standardized tests each year.” 
Treatment Group Two 
Exactly the same as Control Group, but the note on Q10 says “The only requirement would be 
that your school would have to accept all students who applied (and you would be required to 
use random lottery for admissions in the case of oversubscription).” 
Treatment Group Three 
Exactly the same as Control Group, but the note on Q10 says “The only requirement would be 
that your school would have to accept the voucher amount ($6,000) as full payment for voucher 
students.” 
 
 
 
  
